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Abstract. In this paper we investigate the privacy dimension of collaborative
fraud detection envisioned for outsourcing scenarios. Firstly, we investigate the
privacy requirements derived from privacy law and present the resulting judi-
cial argument for pseudonymizing audit data generated for the purpose of fraud
detection. Second, we summarize the requirements for such pseudonymization
derived from the requirements of the misuse detection approach for fraud detec-
tion. Third, we describe our approach for pseudonymization of audit data and two
approaches for hiding timestamps in audit data.
1 Introduction
Fraud often spans different organizations, and in the face of ubiquitous outsourcing,
new opportunities for fraud will be created. Detecting fraud requires a complete pic-
ture of the executed business processes, obviously necessitating collaboration of the
involved organizations for detecting fraud. A main obstacle to collaborative fraud de-
tection are data confidentiality and privacy where parties are reluctant to share their pos-
sibly sensitive data. We briefly analyze the statutory situation, and the effects of some
fraud-detection specific privacy-enhancing technologies in Sect. 2.1 and in Sect. 2.2 we
summarize the techniqual constraints to be respected to be able to effectively detect
fraud incidents on pseudonymized data. In Sect. 3 we present three of our solutions
for collaborative privacy-enhanced fraud detection and conclude with a brief outlook in
Sect. 4.
2 Requirements
2.1 Dimension of Privacy Law
Setting the scene for a discussion of fraud detection with respect to privacy law, this
technology can be briefly described as a technique to analyze the behavior of users in
a technical environment focusing on harmful behavioral patterns. As an asynchronous
process any Fraud Detection System (FDS) requires the storing of activities that occur
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2on a system or use data that is held for other purposes. This information, is from the
legal point of view and as long as the users of a system happen to be natural persons,
personal data. As a result the application of FDS in most real world scenarios has to
adapt to the privacy law, which leads to the question, what requirements have to be
fulfilled by the system provider, to ensure that the application of his FDS is legitimate
from the legal perspective. Afterwards it is possible to think of technical solutions that
might be helpful to meet these requirements and to improve the data privacy standards
of the whole system. As one example implementing the EU Privacy Directive 95/46/EG
we focus on the German privacy law, which is one of the most strict implementations
of the directive, such that results that hold for this law, will with high probability also
hold for less stringent implementations.
Main exigencies are the guarantee of transparency and purpose-binding. Firstly the
user has to be informed about the data that is collected and processed, about the ob-
jectives the controller (typically the one who uses an FDS) and the identity of the con-
troller, if that is not obviously cognizable by the purpose. Secondly the controller is
bound to that purpose. In the case that the data is collected for other reasons (for exam-
ple transactional data) the legislator restricts the circumstances under which a change of
the objectives is possible. If the data is collected just for the purpose of system security
any processing for other reasons is prohibited. Any technical change, which serves both
or one of these requirements of the system, improves the legal compliance.
One important issue from the legal point of view is that the analyzing process runs
on the original data that contains personal data of the persons concerned. The pure ex-
istence and accessibility of this data is a potential risk that the data might be used in an
illegal way. A solution that might limit or even eliminate this risk could significantly
improve the legal compliance of FDS. A solution that is at hand consists of three im-
portant characteristics Sect. 3.1.
1. The data that is stored or analyzed is preliminarily pseudonymized. To the FDS-
Administrators it contains no personal data because linking the data to the "persons
concerned" causes a disproportional effort.
2. The mapping of the original user-identifying attributes to the pseudonyms used in
the FDS is held by a trusted third party - the data privacy law establishes a data
privacy official which is widely privileged and obliged to discretion. This person
can be qualified as trusted.
3. The exposure of the pseudonyms is limited to cases in which the analysis of the
data raises a manifest suspicion against the "person concerned"
(a) In cases where the behavioral pattern that leads to this suspicion was prelimi-
nary known, this process can be automated. That shall be defined as technical
purpose-binding.
(b) When a new kind of harmful behavior is recognized the exposure of a
pseudonym affords the collaboration of the data privacy official and the FDS.
That shall be called organizational purpose binding.
By judicial argumentation we found that this solution at least supports and strength-
ens the compliance of an FDS.
32.2 Technical Dimension
Considering requirements of law and competitive enterprises we find the following con-
flicting goals for collaborative fraud detection:
1. detection effectiveness,
2. privacy of honest individuals,
3. organizational business-related confidentiality requirements, and
4. efficiency.
For this contribution we focus on lossless (information) reductions that work by
splitting the information contained in structured data objects into open data and private
(covered, masked, blinded) data before forwarding it to other organizations [1].
The open data of a lossless reduction is sufficient for detecting fraud, possibly in
conjunction with exploiting certain properties of the private data, or in conjunction with
some support data that must be additionally generated depending on the specific ap-
plication. For this chapter we focus on the misuse detection approach, where known
fraud schemes are modeled and matched to the current business process execution event
stream. If a fraud incident is detected, the private data may be disclosed for the legal
purpose of effectively handling the fraud case. The respective open data together with
the private data allows for the reconstruction of the original information, subject to the
detected fraud. The data with the disclosed information can be used to hold perpetrators
accountable. The following requirements are crucial for the misuse detection approach:
R1: certain data fields (except for timestamps) need to be compared to certain other
data fields for equal content, or equal prefix content
R2: certain data fields (except for timestamps) need to be compared to values outside
of the open data, e.g. constant values, entries of a database
R3: distances of alarm timestamps need to be computed and compared to values out-
side of the open data, i.e. a constant value
R4: the order of alarm timestamps needs to be determined
We have then refined these requirements to the technical level of pseudonymizing
data fields in audit data for fraud detection. In summary the resulting requirements are
that (1) the generated pseudonyms respect the syntax of the audit data, (2) pseudonyms
must be equal for a given data value in different data fields, if R1 requires so, (3) the data
reduction (e.g. hash) function is collision resistant, and (4) pseudonyms for constant
values can be computed during detection to be compared to pseudonyms in the audit
data, if R2 requires so. Additionally, if R1 does not require that the pseudonyms for a
given data value in different data fields needs to be compared, the pseudonyms for the
data value shall be different, in order to reduce inferences with respect to the value.
3 Selected Solutions
3.1 Pseudonymizing Audit Data
The above result translates to our approach for pseudonymizing audit data, such that
it can still be analyzed for occurrences of pattern, e.g. characterizing specific known
4fraud scenarios; while while balancing the conflicting requirements for accountability
and anonymity [2]. In our approach audit data is pseudonymized immediately after it
has been generated, such that users appear under pseudonyms in the audit data. The
pseudonymized audit data maintains the degree of linkability required for fraud detec-
tion. The pseudonymization process also produces additional private data that allows
for the recovery of the original data, subject to specified conditions. The fraud detection
component merely analyzes the pseudonymized audit data with respect to fraud (suspi-
cions). Only if a (threshold) alert occurs, i.e., a fraud suspicion has been detected, the
private data can be used to disclose the original data. After data disclosure accountabil-
ity can be established in order to further investigate anbd mitigate the current incident.
For the private data, the approach leverages threshold schemes for cryptographic
secret sharing: The fraud suspicions for intrusion detection are modeled as thresholds
of secret sharing schemes. We have constructively shown that determining appropriate
thresholds can be achieved by statically analyzing the given fraud models [3]. The pri-
vate data contains the encrypted identifying data that is replaced by the pseudonyms,
and it contains shares of the respective decryption keys. As a result, the disclosure of
the encrypted identifying data is enforced cryptographically, such that decryption is
possible, if and only if the pseudonyms are involved in a sufficient suspicion of fraud
(technical purpose binding), i.e., the number of shares associated with the pseudonyms
exceeds the threshold in the model of the misuse suspicion. Note that it may be nec-
essary to provide the ability to recover the decryption keys independently of a priori
defined models of misuse suspicion in order to investigate misuse that has not (yet)
been modeled. In that case, the grounds for decryption must be scrutinized by one or
more trusted parties (organizational purpose binding).
3.2 Synchronization on Hidden Time Stamps
An important indicator for correlation is time and we introduced a scheme where a third
party can compare timestamps, but only if they are within a certain distance threshold.
If the distance of the two timestamps exceeds the threshold, the third party cannot make
any conclusion about the timestamps. We achieve this by pseudonymizing the times-
tamp using a message authentication code, but giving local distance information. The
pseudonyms are aligned to so-called grid points and if they match one can compute the
distance from the local distance information [4].
A problem with this or any approach that allows similar computations is that
an attacker can gain additional information given a set of timestamps. We showed
that it is unavoidable given such a mechanism. A second problem with the times-
tamp pseudonymization approach is that it requires synchronized clocks. Synchronized
clocks can be a very strong assumption in distributed systems and as a consequence
logical clocks have been developed, that replace absolute time with causality informa-
tion.
Vector clocks provide the most causality information of logical clocks. In a vec-
tor clock system each process keeps an estimate of the other processes’ clocks. Every
time a message is sent these estimates are updated. During such an exchange vector
clocks may reveal information about communication with other parties. In order to pre-
vent this leakage, we developed privacy-preserving vector clocks that encrypt the clock
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tation protocols on the encrypted data and allow a third party to compare vector clock
timestamps without gaining any additional knowledge.
4 Outlook
Not only for timestamp comparisons, but for most operations in collaborative fraud
detection, privacy-preserving alternatives have been defined. Practical systems using
data pseudonymization and hiding (as in the timestamp pseudonymization approach)
are currently emerging, but it is becoming obvious that the security provided by the
combination of privacy-preserving techniques is limited. An avenue of future research
is therefore to either model formally the provided privacy and security of combined
approaches and hopefully provide some useful limitations. A number of attacks can also
possibly be found on the pseudonymized data, as has been done for a large collection
of anonymized data.
Another avenue of research is to strengthen the security of the approaches. This
usually comes at the expense of further performance, but some modern security tech-
nologies can help. We currently investigate an outsourcing scenario, where an enterprise
outsources non-core services as well as the ability for fraud detection. In this scenarion
the enterprise as well as the service providers wish to keep their data confidential. Also
the third party fraud detection provider considers his domain knowledge a competitive
asset, which he wishes to keep secret. We developed a searchable encryption scheme
that protects both the privacy of the fraud detection queries as well as the privacy of the
databases.
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